OUSD (R&E) CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY AREA(S): Emerging Threat Reduction The technology within this topic is restricted under the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR), 22 CFR Parts 120-130, which controls the export and import of defense-related material and services, including export of sensitive technical data, or the Export Administration Regulation (EAR), 15 CFR Parts 730-774, which controls dual use items. Offerors must disclose any proposed use of foreign nationals (FNs), their country(ies) of origin, the type of visa or work permit possessed, and the statement of work (SOW) tasks intended for accomplishment by the FN(s) in accordance with the Announcement. Offerors are advised foreign nationals proposed to perform on this topic may be restricted due to the technical data under US Export Control Laws. OBJECTIVE: Delivery of software capability that automatically detects and evaluates on orbit or space related activity. Evaluation should classify the specific activity as hostile, irresponsible, or other DESCRIPTION: In July 2021, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin published a memo outlining five tenants of responsible space behavior. Operate in, from, and through space with due regard to others and in a professional manner; Limit the generation of long-lived debris; Avoid the creation of harmful interference; Maintain safe separation and safe trajectory; Communicate and make notifications to enhance the safety and stability of the domain. As space continues to become more congested and commoditized there is a growing need to identify and understand irresponsible space behaviors. Understanding what those activities look like and identifying patterns such as type of irresponsible activity, associated elevation in threat level to other space objects, responsible party, and other key pieces of information will provide the space community with a deeper understanding and awareness. Additionally, this level of understanding can be leveraged to better understand and establish a prescribed list of space activity norms and standards. Space Systems Command (SSC) Space Domain Awareness (SDA) Tap Lab is seeking solutions to provide a software capability that can automatically detect and classify on-orbit activities as hostile or irresponsible. Anticipated data sources are orbital data (elsets, state vector, observations, or other), pattern of life assessments and behavior patterns, and other open-source datasets. The software product must be able to be integrated into existing toolchains that are used by USSF operators and the SDA Tap Lab. As this capability is only one specific functionality to be used in conjunction with other tools to provide a wholistic understanding of space domain awareness and space operations, it is pivotal that the solution be able to seamless integrate with existing systems through API call. The solution must also meet all development and operational requirements for system integration and use on classified systems. PHASE I: The Phase I will involve conducting a feasibility study and developing a proof of concept for a software capability that can automatically detect and classify on-orbit activities as irresponsible, adversarial, or other. The proposed solution should demonstrate the ability to accurately classify and analyze on-orbit activities based on predefined criteria, such as patterns of behavior and associated threat levels. The feasibility study should assess the scientific and technical merit of the proposed approach, including the feasibility of integrating various data sources such as orbital data, pattern of life assessments, and other open-source datasets. Additionally, the Phase I effort should include a clear plan for how the proposed solution will be integrated into existing toolchains used by USSF operators and the SDA Tap Lab, as well as how it will meet development and operational requirements for use on classified systems. Funding for Phase I may be sought through government programs such as the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program or other Department of Defense (DoD) initiatives focused on space domain awareness and threat detection. PHASE II: Phase II involves building upon the concept developed in Phase I to enhance its capabilities and performance. This includes refining the software capability to improve evaluation metrics such as accuracy, precision, F1 score, and other relevant performance indicators. Additionally, Phase II should focus on expanding the breadth of input data used for detecting and classifying on-orbit activities. This broader dataset will enable a more comprehensive assessment of various types of space-related events, thereby enhancing the overall scope and effectiveness of the software solution. The Phase II effort should involve rigorous testing and validation to ensure that the refined concept meets the operational requirements of the Space Systems Command (SSC) Space Domain Awareness (SDA) Tap Lab and USSF operators. PHASE III DUAL USE APPLICATIONS: Phase III dual use involves scaling up the finalized model developed in Phase II to encompass the analysis of all launch events and expanding its notification functionality. This means extending the software capability to detect, classify, and analyze a wider range of space-related activities, including not only on-orbit events but also all launch events. Furthermore, the notification functionality should be enhanced to provide timely alerts to relevant stakeholders, including USSF operators and other government agencies, about detected launch events and on-orbit activities. In addition to its military application, this expanded capability could have dual-use potential for commercial space operators and international partners interested in enhancing their own space domain awareness and situational awareness capabilities. For example, commercial satellite operators could benefit from early detection and notification of launch events to protect their assets and ensure uninterrupted operations. International partners may also find value in leveraging the software capability to enhance their own space surveillance and tracking capabilities, contributing to global space domain awareness efforts. To facilitate the transition of this technology, partnerships with industry stakeholders, international collaborators, and government agencies involved in space surveillance and tracking should be pursued. Funding strategies may involve continued government support through programs such as SBIR or other research and development initiatives focused on space domain awareness and space situational awareness. Integration plans should prioritize interoperability with existing systems and toolchains used by USSF operators and other relevant entities, ensuring seamless integration into operational environments. Additionally, engagement with the ATLAS Dynamic Event Processing Space Threat Need program of record should be considered to align with broader Department of Defense priorities and initiatives in space domain awareness. REFERENCES: 1. S. Flanagan et al., "A Framework of Deterrence in Space Operations", Rand Corporation, 2023.; KEYWORDS: Responsible space; classification; space domain awareness; SDA; on orbit activity
